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A. ARTICLE 21.551AN ongoing issue of debate in Texas is whether Article 21.55 of
the Texas Insurance Code applies to an insured's claim for a de-
fense under a liability policy. While several federal district
courts in Texas have previously concluded that an insured's demand for a
defense is a first-party claim that is subject to Article 21.55, three state
courts of appeals issued opinions during this Survey period rejecting the
application of Article 21.55 to the duty to defend.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals explained that Article 21.55 applies
to "'a first party claim ... that must be paid by the insurer directly to the
insured or beneficiary.'"2 A first-party claim is one in which the insured
seeks recovery for its own loss; conversely, a third-party claim requires
the insurer to perform its duty to indemnify not directly to the insured,
but rather, on the insured's behalf, to a third-party claimant injured by
the insured's conduct. 3 Emphasizing that the duty to defend arises only
in connection with a third-party claim, the court of appeals explained that
the insured's claim did not involve damage to its own property and did
not seek recovery for its own personal injuries, but instead only sought
reimbursement of the costs it incurred in defending a third party suit
brought against it.4 The court of appeals further noted that the Dallas
Court of Appeals had previously concluded, based on the plain language
of Article 21.55, that any attempt to apply the statute's structure to a
claim for a defense is unworkable and clearly unintended by the
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1. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.55 (VERNON 1991). Effective April 1, 2005, Article
21.55 was repealed and recodified, without any substantive change, as Subchapter B of
Chapter 542 of the Texas Insurance Code, entitled "Prompt Payment of Claims." TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. §§ 542.051-.061 (VERNON 2006).
2. Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 187 S.W.3d 91,106 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth






Stating that it found this reasoning persuasive, the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals held that Article 21.55 does not apply to claims for reimburse-
ment of defense costs incurred in defending a third-party claim.6 In
reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals recognized that it was hold-
ing contrary to decisions of several federal courts construing Texas law,
but stated that such decisions did not analyze the issue with the same
amount of detail as the Dallas Court of Appeals; instead, such decisions
relied on prior decisions without considering the persuasiveness of those
authorities on this issue.7 The Houston and San Antonio Courts of Ap-
peals have followed the decisions of their sister courts and also declined
to apply Article 21.55 to the duty to defend.8
In contrast to the state appellate courts, the federal district courts in
Texas have continued to apply Article 21.55 to claims for defense costs.
Indeed, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas stated that applicable federal and Texas state cases "generally clas-
sify an insurer's duty to defend as a first-party claim," and "[t]his 'major-
ity view' holds that, although typically part of a liability policy that would
be considered 'third-party,' the duty to defend is a form of first-party in-
surance."9 The district court explained that in third-party insurance
claims, the interests of the insured and insurer are typically aligned
against a third party and that when a claim arises that concerns the rela-
tionship between the insurer and the insured, that claim can become a
first-party claim.10 Although the policy at issue disavowed the insurer of
any traditional duty to defend, it did obligate the insurer to advance, on
behalf of the insured, covered defense costs that the insured incurred in
connection with a claim made against it. The district court found that the
claim for these costs concerned only the relationship between the insured
and the insurer, and no third party. Rather, the insured suffered a direct
loss in the amount of its defense costs, and the insured sought recovery
for amounts that must be paid by the insurer directly to the insured, as
opposed to any loss suffered by a third party.11 For these reasons, the
district court concluded that the insured's claim for reimbursement of its
defense costs constituted a first-party claim and, therefore, was a covered
5. Id. at 106-07 (citing TIG Ins. Co. v. Dallas Basketball, Ltd., 129 S.W.3d 232, 239
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied)); see also Summit Custom Homes, Inc. v. Great Am.
Lloyds Ins. Co., 202 S.W.3d 823, 833 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. filed) (following its
holding in Dallas Basketball and concluding that Article 21.55 is not applicable to an in-
sured's defense claim).
6. Id. at 107.
7. Id. at 107-08.
8. Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 14-05-00487-CV, 2006
WL 1892669, at *12-13 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 6, 2006, no pet.); Serv.
Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. J.C. Wink, Inc., 182 S.W.3d 19, 30-33 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005,
pet. filed).
9. HCC Employer Servs., Inc. v. Westchester County Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. H-
05-1275, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36391, at *27 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2006).
10. Id. at *27-28.
11. Id. at *28-29.
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claim under Article 21.55.12
These decisions are essentially irreconcilable. Thus, there exists a split
in authority between the state appellate courts and the federal district
courts as to whether Article 21.55 applies to a claim for defense costs.
Recognizing this split, the Fifth Circuit certified the following issue to the
Texas Supreme Court: "[D]oes Article 21.55 of the Texas Insurance Code
apply to a CGL insurer's breach of the duty to defend?"' 13 While the
supreme court has accepted this case and heard oral argument, it will
most likely address the question only if it first determines that the insurer
at issue breached the duty to defend. Thus, there is a chance that this
issue will remain unresolved and the conflict between federal and state
courts will continue.
Further, in what appears to be the first case to do so, the District Court
for the Southern District of Texas' opinion in HCC Employer Services,
Inc. went a step beyond prior federal district court opinions by applying
Article 21.55 to the duty to defend as well as to the duty to indemnify in
the context of a third-party liability claim.14 Without citing any addi-
tional authority, the district court relied on its discussion with respect to
the insured's claim for defense costs and decided that a "similar analysis"
could be applied to the insured's claim for reimbursement of the amount
of an arbitration award it paid to settle a lawsuit brought against it by a
third party. 15 The district court determined that the insured suffered a
direct loss in the amount of the award and that the insured's claim against
the insurer simply sought recovery for that loss and involved amounts
that must be paid by the insurer directly to the insured. For these rea-
sons, the district court concluded that this claim for indemnification also
constituted a claim covered under Article 21.55.16
B. ARTICLE 21.211 7
In Travelers Personal Security Insurance Co. v. McClelland,18 the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals for the First District reviewed the trial court's grant
of the insurer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which
overturned the jury's imposition of extra-contractual damages for viola-
tion of Article 21.21. While acknowledging that the issue before it was
the legal sufficiency of the evidence to show a statutory violation, the
court of appeals apparently reviewed the evidence under the common-
law-bad-faith standard. Specifically, the court of appeals enunciated the
12. Id. at *29.
13. Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 428 F.3d 193, 201 (5th Cir. 2005).
14. HCC Employer Servs., Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36391, at *29-30.
15. Id. at *29.
16. Id. at *29-30.
17. TEX. INs. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (VERNON 1991). Effective April 1, 2005, Article
21.21 was repealed and recodified, without any substantive change, as Chapter 541 of the
Texas Insurance Code, entitled "Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair or Deceptive
Acts or Practices." TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.001 (VERNON 2006).
18. 189 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
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governing standard as: "Under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, an
insurer violates its duty of good faith and fair dealing by denying or de-
laying payment of a claim when the insurer knew or should have known
that it was reasonably clear that the claim was covered."' 9 Additionally,
the court of appeals based its analysis on State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau,20
the "touchstone case for bad-faith insurance claims," which instructs that
evidence showing only a bona-fide coverage dispute, standing alone, does
not show bad faith, but that an insurer cannot shield itself from bad-faith
liability by investigating a claim in a manner calculated to construct a
pretextual basis for denying a claim. 21
Reviewing the evidence under this standard, the court of appeals em-
phasized that this case presented "a close call."' 22 The homeowners' pol-
icy at issue excluded coverage for foundation damage due to "natural
causes," but an exception to the exclusion covered the resulting damage
from foundation movement due to plumbing leaks. 23 The insurer denied
the insureds' claim for structural damage to the house from foundation
movement based on a report from its engineering expert, which found
that the damage was not due to the plumbing leak. Conversely, while
conceding that natural causes were part of the problem, the insureds' ex-
pert determined that the plumbing leak triggered the movement that
caused the damage to the house. 24 As in Nicolau, the evidence showed
that the insurer's engineer worked almost exclusively for insurance com-
panies, knew that plumbing leaks were covered under the policy, and
found no connection between plumbing leaks and foundation problems
eighty-five to ninety percent of the time.25
The court of appeals explained that although this evidence allowed for
the "logical inference" that the insurer hired this particular engineering
firm because it consistently found no connection between plumbing leaks
and foundation damage, a finding of bad faith under Nicolau requires
evidence of behavior more egregious than merely hiring a firm whose
reports generally feature an outcome favored by its recipient.26 Further,
a simple disagreement among experts about whether the cause of the loss
was one covered by the policy will not establish bad faith; rather, the
insured must prove that the insurer had no reasonable basis for denying
or delaying payment and that the insurer knew or should have known
that fact.27 Applying these principles, the court of appeals determined
that the evidence marshaled by the insureds only showed the insurer's
"proclivity to hire an expert of its own preference," and a "simple disa-
19. Id. at 852.
20. State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1997).
21. McClelland, 189 S.W.3d at 852 (citing Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d at 448).
22. Id. at 853.
23. Id. at 848.
24. Id. at 848-49.
25. Id. at 853.
26. Id. at 853-54.
27. Id. at 854.
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greement among experts."'28 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded
that the evidence did not support a judgment for bad faith and, therefore,
was legally insufficient to support the jury's finding of extra-contractual
damages.2 9
II. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. THE DUTY TO DEFEND
1. Whether There Is an Exception to the "Eight-Corners" Rule That
Permits Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence in Determining
the Duty to Defend
a. The Texas Supreme Court Noted That Other Courts Recognize a
Narrow Exception but Declined To Do So under the
Facts of the Case Before It
An ongoing issue of debate in Texas has been whether any exception to
the "eight-corners," or "complaint-allegation" rule, exists that would per-
mit the consideration of extrinsic evidence in determining an insurer's
duty to defend. The Texas Supreme Court finally provided some gui-
dance on this issue in GuideOne Elite Insurance Co. v. Fielder Road Bap-
tist Church.30 The claimant filed a sexual misconduct lawsuit against the
insured church and its minister, alleging in her pleadings that, at all mate-
rial times from 1992 to 1994, the minister was employed by and was under
the church's direct supervision and control when he sexually exploited
and abused her. The church demanded defense and indemnity from the
insurer, which agreed to defend under a reservation of rights. 31 The in-
surer filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it had
no duty to defend or indemnify the church. Through discovery during the
coverage action, the insured advised the insurer that the minister had
ceased working for it on December 15, 1992, before the insurer's policy
took effect. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the
insurer, declaring that it had no duty to defend. However, the court of
appeals reversed the judgment, concluding that the trial court had erred
in considering extrinsic evidence to defeat the duty to defend.32
The Texas Supreme Court explained that Texas follows the eight-cor-
ners or complaint-allegation rule, which holds that only two documents
are ordinarily relevant to determining the insurer's duty to defend: the
policy and the pleading of the third-party claimant. Under this rule, the
pleadings are considered in light of the policy provisions without regard
to the truth or falsity of those allegations; facts outside the pleadings-
even those easily ascertained-are ordinarily not material to the determi-
nation; and allegations against the insured are liberally construed in favor
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 197 S.W.3d 305, 306-07 (Tex. 2006).




of coverage.33 The supreme court noted that, although it has never ex-
pressly recognized an exception to the eight-corners rule, other courts
have drawn a very narrow exception, and have permitted the use of ex-
trinsic evidence only when relevant to an independent and discrete cover-
age issue that does not address the merits of the underlying third-party
claim. 34
Because the extrinsic evidence relied on by the insurer was relevant to
both coverage and the merits, and thus did not fit into the previously
recognized exception to the eight-corners rule, the insurer asserted that
the supreme court should broaden the exception to include this type of
"mixed" or "overlapping" extrinsic evidence. 35 Emphasizing that very lit-
tle support exists for this position and that the Fifth Circuit previously
rejected a similar use of overlapping facts for this purpose, the supreme
court "likewise reject[ed] the use of overlapping evidence as an exception
to the eight-corners rule because it poses a significant risk of undermining
the insured's ability to defend itself in the underlying litigation.
36
The supreme court further explained that those courts that have recog-
nized an exception to the eight-corners rule have done so under limited
circumstances involving pure coverage questions, and that if it were to
recognize the exception urged by the insurer, it "would by necessity con-
flate the insurer's defense and indemnity duties without regard for the
policy's express terms."'37 Specifically, the policy obligated the insurer to
indemnify the church in the event of a meritorious claim for sexual mis-
conduct, but, with respect to the duty to defend, the policy required the
insurer to "'defend any suit brought against [the insured] seeking dam-
ages, even if the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent
.... ,"38 Thus, the policy defined the duty to defend more broadly than
the duty to indemnify, and the former is the circumstance assumed to
exist under the eight-corners rule. A claimant's factual allegations that
potentially support a covered claim is all that is needed to invoke the
insurer's duty to defend; conversely, the facts actually established in the
underlying suit control the duty to indemnify. Applying these principles,
the supreme court decided that the claimant's allegations-that the min-
ister assaulted her during the policy period and was a minister at the
church at the time-were sufficient to trigger the insurer's duty to
defend. 39
In reaching this decision, the supreme court rejected the insurer's con-
tention that it should not have to defend because the minister was not in
fact an employee during the policy period; the supreme court explained
that the duty to defend does not turn on the truth or falsity of the claim-
33. Id. at 308.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 309.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 310.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 310-11.
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ant's allegations, and where the insurer knows the allegations to be un-
true, it must establish such facts in defense of its insured rather than as an
adversary in a declaratory judgment action.40 The supreme court also re-
jected an amicus's suggestion that it should adopt a "true-facts exception"
to the eight-corners rule to prevent the rule's recurring use as a tool for
fraud, noting that the record did "not suggest collusion or the existence of
a pervasive problem in Texas with fraudulent allegations designed solely
to create a duty to defend. ' 41 Accordingly, the supreme court concluded
that application of the eight-corners rule in this case conformed with the
parties' contract and that "the circumstances of this case present[ed] no
basis for an exception to that rule."'42
b. After GuideOne, Other Courts Have Continued to Recognize
That Extrinsic Evidence May Be Considered in Certain
Circumstances
Although the Texas Supreme Court declined to apply an exception to
the eight-corners rule under the circumstances in GuideOne, subsequent
decisions from other courts have interpreted this decision as leaving open
the possibility of such an exception. For example, in B. Hall Contracting
Inc. v. Evanston Insurance Co.,43 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas explained that extrinsic evidence establishing
non-coverage, specifically, facts establishing the applicability of a "Roof-
ing Endorsement exclusion," did not contradict any allegations in the un-
derlying state court pleadings, but instead was "perfectly consistent" with
allegations made in the state court pleadings.44
The insurer in B. Hall Contracting was not taking the position that any
allegation made in the state court pleadings was false or fraudulent;
rather, the insurer accepted the allegations of the state court pleadings as
true but pointed out that there was no insurance coverage for the claims
asserted by those allegations. The district court determined that the in-
stant situation was quite different from that in GuideOne, where the fact
on which the insurer relied to avoid coverage disputed a pleaded fact that
was an element of the underlying damage suit, and where the issue was
not one of coverage, but rather one of the merit of the underlying allega-
tions.45 The district court emphasized that the potential merit of the
damage suit was a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether
the damages alleged in that suit were covered under the policy. While,
coincidentally, some of the same facts might have been relevant to those
separate issues, none of the facts relied on by the insurer to defeat insur-
ance coverage would contradict, much less defeat, the claims asserted in
40. Id. at 311.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 447 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
44. Id. at 646 (quoting GuideOne, 197 S.W.3d at 305).
45. Id. at 647.
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the underlying SUit.46 Accordingly, the district court concluded that the
extrinsic evidence establishing non-coverage was relevant to an indepen-
dent and discrete coverage issue not touching on the merits of the under-
lying claims, and, therefore, the exception to the eight-corners rule
applied.4 7
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
similarly interpreted GuideOne as permitting a narrow exception to the
eight-corners rule in certain circumstances where the extrinsic evidence
relates solely to the coverage issue:
Although the Texas Supreme Court explicitly rejected the use of ex-
trinsic evidence that was relevant both to coverage and to the merits
of the underlying action, it did not rule on the validity of a more
narrow exception that would allow extrinsic evidence solely on the
issue of coverage. In fact, the language of the opinion hints that the
court views the more narrow exception favorably. For example, the
court specifically acknowledged that other courts recognized a nar-
row exception for extrinsic evidence that is relevant to the discrete
issue of coverage and noted that the Fifth Circuit had opined that,
were any exception to be recognized by the Texas high court, it
would likely be such a narrow exception.48
The district court also noted that the GuideOne court distinguished, but
did not overrule, the International Services Insurance Co. v. Boll4 9 deci-
sion in which the Houston Court of Appeals relied on an external stipula-
tion to find that the underlying allegations were not covered.50 The
district court determined that the case before it was similar to Boll in that
"external undisputed information readily clarifies vague allegations in the
pleadings."''s Specifically, although the third-party petition filed by the
defendant against the insured made no mention of the time period during
which the property damage occurred, the petitions filed by the plaintiffs
against the defendant did allege the pertinent dates. Because the relief
that the defendant sought from the insured was based entirely on the
allegations of the plaintiffs in the same underlying lawsuit, the district
court concluded that it could rely on extrinsic evidence in the form of the
plaintiffs' petitions "to fill in the temporal details" that were necessary to
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Bayou Bend Homes, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. H-05-1544, 2006 WL 2037564,
at *5 (S.D. Tex. July 18, 2006) (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted). The
district court also noted that a state intermediate appellate court had taken a similar ap-
proach. Id. at *5 n.27 (citing Pine Oak Builders, 2006 WL 1892669, at *5-6 (rejecting a
more permissive rule that would allow the consideration of extrinsic evidence whenever
the evidence does not contradict the pleadings, but suggesting, without explicitly stating,
that it would allow extrinsic evidence to establish fundamental coverage facts)).
49. Int'l Servs. Ins. Co. v. Boll, 392 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
50. Bayou Bend Homes, 2006 WL 2037564, at *5 (referencing id.).
51. Id. at *6.
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determine the coverage issue.52
2. The Insurer's Right to Control the Defense
The article for the last Survey included a decision by the Fifth Circuit
allowing an insurer to intervene to challenge on appeal an adverse liabil-
ity judgment entered against its insured. 53 The Fifth Circuit subsequently
issued a second opinion in this case upon its denial of the claimants' peti-
tion for rehearing. 54 The Fifth Circuit explained that, under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 24(a), a "direct" interest is required to intervene as of
right.55 By definition, an interest is not direct when it is contingent on the
outcome of a subsequent lawsuit. When an insurer defends a suit against
its insured under a full reservation of its right to contest coverage later,
the insurer's interest in the liability lawsuit is contingent upon the out-
come of the coverage lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit determined that this in-
terest, without more, is insufficient for intervention.56 This case,
however, presented a different situation. The insurer initially defended
the insured under a full reservation of rights and denied coverage for a
particular claim based on a line of cases from the Fifth Circuit. After the
Texas Supreme Court issued a decision rejecting the Fifth Circuit's ap-
proach, the insurer defended from that point forward under a limited res-
ervation of rights, accepting coverage for any negligent conduct while
denying coverage for any intentional conduct. The Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that once the insurer accepted coverage over any negligence liabil-
ity on the part of its insured, it had a direct interest in the liability lawsuit
and, therefore, a sufficient interest to intervene. 57
B. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY BASED ON WAIVER OR ESTOPPEL
In Ulico Casualty Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n,58 the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals addressed the circumstances in which an insurer may waive or be
estopped from asserting coverage defenses. 59 In this case, the insured
sought coverage for an underlying suit against it, and the insurer agreed
to cover the insured's defense costs pursuant to a reservation of rights.
Approximately a year and a half later, the insurer realized that the in-
sured had not reported the claim during the policy period as required by
52. Id.; see also J.C. Wink, Inc., 182 S.W.3d at 1, 28-29 (rejecting the insurer's argu-
ment that it had no duty to defend because the underlying petition did not allege that the
insured harmed the plaintiff during the policy period, and determining that although the
petition did not give specific dates for the disputed sales, it did allege that all sales occurred
between a certain date and the date when suit was filed, a period that encompassed the
policy period, and, therefore, that the petition potentially alleged damages from conduct
occurring during the policy period).
53. Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 456 F.3d 442, 442
(5th Cir. 2006).
54. Ross v. Marshall, 456 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 1125 (2007).
55. Id. at 443 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 443-44.
58. 187 S.W.3d 91, 98 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. granted).
59. Id. at 98-102.
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the policy, at which point the insurer brought a declaratory judgment ac-
tion against the insured, seeking a declaration that it did not owe the
defense costs. The insured counterclaimed for breach of contract. The
trial court entered judgment in favor of the insured under a waiver and
estoppel theory of liability.60
The court of appeals explained that, while estoppel generally cannot be
used to create coverage when none exists under the policy, the Wilkinson
exception to this general rule provides, "an insurer undertaking or contin-
uing defense of a claim while having knowledge of facts indicating the
claim is not covered under its policy, without an effective reservation of
rights, may waive or be estopped from asserting all policy defenses, in-
cluding the defense of noncoverage. ''61 This exception is based on the
actual or potential conflict of interest that arises when an insurer assumes
the defense and represents the insured in an underlying suit and simulta-
neously formulates its defense against the insured for noncoverage.
62
The court of appeals emphasized that although neither it nor the Texas
Supreme Court had ever addressed the Wilkinson exception, the excep-
tion had been employed by state appellate courts and federal courts in
the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, for over twenty years and was "well-
established. '63
Reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in the context of the Wilkin-
son exception, the court of appeals first addressed the insurer's conten-
tion that the exception requires the insurer to have actual control of the
defense. Rejecting such a narrow interpretation, the court of appeals em-
phasized that Wilkinson and other cases applying the exception do not
require the presence of an actual conflict between the insurer and in-
sured, but, rather, they apply the exception based on the potential for
such a conflict. 64 The court of appeals explained the fact that the under-
lying suit was resolved favorably for the insured on summary judgment
did not alleviate the potential for conflict between the insurer and the
insured, and the insurer should not get a "free pass" simply because the
insured successfully defended the suit. 65 Although the insurer did not
control the insured's counsel or its defense, the insurer did agree to pay
defense costs and also attempted to assert a provision in the policy
prohibiting the insured from incurring defense costs without the insurer's
prior approval. Further, had the insured not prevailed in the suit, the
insurer, knowing that it was investigating the coverage issue, could have
refused to approve fees and costs related to discovery, the procurement
of experts, or other matters related to the defense. Under these facts, the
court of appeals determined that the insurer did undertake or assume the
60. Id. at 95-97.
61. Id. at 98 (citing Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 601 S.W.2d 520,
521-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 99.




defense of the suit against the insured.66
The court of appeals next addressed the Wilkinson exception's require-
ment of a showing that the insured was prejudiced by the insurer's con-
duct. The court of appeals found that even though the insured was able
to successfully defend itself with the counsel of its choice, it was neverthe-
less harmed by the insurer's representation that it would provide cover-
age for defense costs. 67 First, the insured was denied the opportunity to
negotiate a satisfactory premium for an extension of the policy's expira-
tion date. Second, instead of immediately informing the insured about
the coverage mistake, the insurer waited six months to take any action.
When it finally did take action, it initiated a declaratory judgment action
against the insured without informing the insured that it was withdrawing
its coverage of defense costs, and thereby forcing the insured to incur
additional fees to defend the coverage action. Based on these facts, the
court of appeals determined that there was more than a mere scintilla of
evidence that the insured was prejudiced by the insurer's actions.68 Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that the Wilkinson exception applied and
that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings on
waiver and estoppel. 69
C. NOTICE AND COOPERATION PROVISIONS
Several federal and state courts issued opinions during this Survey pe-
riod addressing the circumstances under which an insurer may deny cov-
erage based on an insured's breach of a policy's notice or cooperation
provision, including what constitutes breach of such provisions, whether
the insurer is required to show prejudice from the breach, and, if so, what
evidence is necessary to establish prejudice.
1. The Fifth Circuit Certified Questions to the Texas Supreme Court
Concerning the Application of a Notice Requirement to an
Additional Insured
In Crocker v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,70 the Fifth Circuit
analyzed whether an additional insured's failure to comply with the pol-
icy's notice requirement barred coverage. The general-liability policy was
issued to the employer as the named insured and provided coverage for
its employee as an additional insured. The insurer had provided a de-
fense in the underlying suit for the employer but not for the employee,
since the latter had not notified the insurer of the suit or requested a
defense from the insurer. The claimant obtained a default judgment
against the employee and sought recovery under the policy. It was undis-
66. Id.
67. Id. at 100-01.
68. Id. at 101-02.
69. Id. at 102.




puted that the claims against both the employer and the employee were
covered under the policy. The insurer knew the employee was a named
defendant in the suit, and knew or should have known, that he had been
served. The employee was not aware of the policy, did not know he was
an additional insured, did not forward the suit papers to the insurer or
otherwise inform it that he had been sued, and did not request a defense
from the insurer or the employer. The insurer did not inform the em-
ployee that he was an additional insured and did not offer to defend
him.71
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis with Weaver v. Hartford Accident
and Indemnity Co.,72 where the Texas Supreme Court determined that an
additional insured's ignorance of the policy did not excuse its failure to
comply with the policy's notice-of-suit provision.73 The Fifth Circuit ex-
plained that if it applied Weaver to the case before it, then the employee's
ignorance of his rights and obligations under the policy would be no ex-
cuse for his failure to comply with the notice provisions, the insurer
would have had no duty to inform him of his rights and obligations as an
additional insured, and the insurer's actual and timely notice of the acci-
dent and the suit would not have satisfied the purposes of the notice pro-
vision because the insurer did not know that it was expected to defend
the employee. The Fifth Circuit, however, decided that subsequent
changes in Texas insurance law raised the question of whether Weaver
controlled.74
The Fifth Circuit identified the principal change in Texas insurance law
as the 1973 Order by the State Board of Insurance mandating an endorse-
ment for all general liability policies requiring that an insurer be
prejudiced by an insured's failure to provide notice before it can avoid
liability due to such failure. 75 After reviewing numerous subsequent fed-
eral and state cases, the Fifth Circuit determined that, with the require-
ment for an insurer to show prejudice to avoid liability in certain cases,
the landscape of Texas insurance law had changed in some respects since
Weaver, but that questions remained as to just how the law had changed
as applied to the present facts. 76 In the absence of controlling Texas Su-
preme Court precedent on the determinative legal issues, the Fifth Circuit
decided to certify the following questions to the supreme court:
1. Where an additional insured does not and cannot be presumed
to know of coverage under an insurer's liability policy, does an in-
surer that has knowledge that a suit implicating policy coverage has
71. Id. at 347, 348-50.
72. Weaver v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 570 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1978).
73. Crocker, 466 F.3d at 351-53 (citing id. at 368-70).
74. Id. at 353-54.
75. Id. at 354 (citing Chiles v. Chubb Lloyds Ins. Co., 858 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (quoting State Bd. of Ins., Revision of Texas
Standard Provision For General Liability Policies-Amendatory Endorsement-Notice,
Order No. 23080 (Mar. 13, 1973)).
76. Id. at 358-59.
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been filed against its additional insured have a duty to inform the
additional insured of the available coverage?
2. If the above question is answered in the affirmative, what is the
extent or proper measure of the insurer's duty to inform the addi-
tional insured, and what is the extent or measure of any duty on the
part of the additional insured to cooperate with the insurer up to the
point he is informed of the policy provisions?
3. Does proof of an insurer's actual knowledge of service of process
in a suit against its additional insured, when such knowledge is ob-
tained in sufficient time to provide a defense for the insured, estab-
lish as a matter of law the absence of prejudice to the insurer from
the additional insured's failure to comply with the notice-of-suit pro-
visions of the policy? 77
2. The Issue of Compliance with a Notice Provision Is Evaluated
under an Objective Standard of Reasonableness
In Blanton v. Vesta Lloyds Insurance Co.,78 the notice provision of the
general liability policy required the insured to notify the insurer "as soon
as practicable of an 'occurrence' or an offense which may result in a
claim."'79 The Dallas Court of Appeals explained that the issue of
whether the insured complied with this provision is not evaluated from
the insured's subjective perspective, but rather, under the objective stan-
dard of reasonable prudence that requires the insured to give notice "as
soon as notice would have been given by an ordinary prudent person in
the exercise of ordinary care in the same or similar circumstances. '80
What constitutes a reasonable time for giving notice depends on the indi-
vidual facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the in-
sured's age, experience, and capacity for understanding and knowing that
coverage exists in its favor. But an insured has no duty to report an oc-
currence if, after the insured has fully acquainted itself with all the facts
surrounding the occurrence, it appears that the occurrence was of such a
nature that it could not reasonably be expected to result in any claim or
liability.81
Reviewing the evidence under this objective standard, the court of ap-
peals concluded that the insured breached the policy's notice provision.82
Specifically, the evidence showed that the claimant first complained to
the insured about roof leaks in the property he had leased from the in-
77. Id. at 359; see also First Prof'l Ins. Co. v. Heart & Vascular Inst. of Tex. 182 S.W.3d
6, 10-14 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied) (concluding that, under a claims-
made policy, notice to the insurer of claims made against two physicians practicing in the
same medical group did not constitute timely notice of a claim against the group itself,
where the policy required notice of "claims," not a liability "event," and where the letters
from the claimants that were forwarded to the insurer did not assert a claim against the
group).
78. 185 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
79. Id. at 611.
80. Id. at 611, 614.
81. Id. at 611-12.
82. Id. at 615.
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sured within six or eight months after moving in; the claimant complained
"pretty consistently" about the roof leaks during the entire course of his
tenancy; and the insured received about thirty complaints from the claim-
ant, which were far in excess of the complaints the insured had received
on his other properties.83 Nevertheless, the insured did not notify the
insurer of the occurrence until after he was served in the suit brought by
the claimant, which was over two and half years after the claimant's first
complaint. Emphasizing that lack of knowledge that a claim could be
made is not an excuse for failing to comply with a notice provision, the
court of appeals found that the evidence did not establish excuse because
it did not show that the insured made a full, complete, and fair investiga-
tion of all the facts and surrounding circumstances of the "excessive"
complaints to reasonably conclude that the occurrence was of such a na-
ture that it could not reasonably be expected to result in any claim or
liability.84
Evaluating whether the insurer was prejudiced by the insured's late no-
tice, the court of appeals instructed that a showing of prejudice generally
requires a showing that one of the recognized purposes of the notice re-
quirement has been impaired. One such purpose is to enable the insurer
to investigate the circumstances of an occurrence while the matter is fresh
in the witnesses' minds so that the insurer can adequately prepare to ad-
just or defend any subsequent claims.85 The insured argued that the in-
surer was not prejudiced because it was not prevented from conducting
discovery during the suit and because it received notice prior to the entry
of a judgment. Rejecting this argument, the court of appeals emphasized
that "prejudice from failure to notify timely arises from inability to inves-
tigate the circumstances of an occurrence to prepare adequately to adjust
or defend any claims, not merely to prepare for trial. '86 Because the in-
sured's evidence failed to address the insurer's inability to conduct a
timely investigation, the court of appeals concluded that the insured had
failed to raise a fact issue as to prejudice and, therefore, that the trial
court had properly granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer.8 7
3. An Insured Does Not Satisfy a Notice Requirement by Notifying Its
Agent
In Executive Risk Indemnity, Inc. v. First State Bank, N.A.,88 the in-
83. Id. at 612, 615.
84. Id. at 609, 613, 614-15.
85. Id. at 611-12.
86. Id. at 615.
87. Id. But cf. Gibbons-Markey v. Tex. Med. Liab. Trust, 163 F. App'x 342, 344-46
(5th Cir. 2006) (despite a five-month delay from the time the insured learned of the default
judgment and when she notified the insurer, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the supreme
court would not find an insurer prejudiced as a matter of law by a post-default notice
where the insured was also unaware of the suit until after default had been entered, and
that the insurer had not shown prejudice under the specific facts of the case because there
was viable post-judgment relief still available at the time the insurer received notice).
88. No. 3:05-CV-0051-D, 2006 WL 42359 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2006).
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sured argued that the insurer received reasonable notice because the in-
sured sent the claim to an insurance agent whom the insurer and insured
had established as a "go-between contact," and this agent's knowledge of
the claim became the insurer's knowledge constructively, regardless of
whether the agent had actually communicated this knowledge to the in-
surer.89 In rejecting this argument, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas explained that, under Texas law, an insur-
ance agent can act as an agent for both the insured and the insurer. Gen-
erally speaking, an agent acts for the insured in making applications and
in processing the policy and, on the other hand, acts for the insurer in
delivering the policy and in collecting and remitting premiums. 90 While
such agency issues are usually questions of fact, the district court deter-
mined that there was no question of fact here because the insured's own
statements identified the agent as its agent, not an agent of the insurer.
The district court therefore concluded that this notice to the agent did not
constitute notice to the insurer, and that the notice given directly to the
insurer twenty-eight months after the claim was first made was not given
as soon as practicable. 91
4. No Coverage for Settlement Reached Without Notice to or Consent
from the Insurer
In Motiva Enterprises, L.L.C. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Co.,92 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the insurer was not required to
reimburse the insured for a settlement it had paid without giving notice to
or obtaining consent from the insurer.93 The policy at issue contained a
standard consent-to-settle clause requiring the insurer's advance consent
to any settlements that it would be funding as well as a standard coopera-
tion clause requiring the insured to cooperate with the insurer in the in-
vestigation, settlement, and defense of claims. 94 The insured requested
that the insurer attend a mediation in an underlying suit, but the insured
later refused the insurer's request for documents pertaining to the suit
and asked the insurer's representative to leave the mediation before it
had concluded. The mediation continued without the insurer's presence,
and the insured reached a settlement. The insured asked the insurer to
fund the settlement, but the insurer refused on the ground that its consent
had not been obtained. The insured paid the settlement out of its own
funds and sued the insurer for reimbursement.95
Relying on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rhodes v. Chicago Insurance
Co.96 the insured argued that because the insurer's tender of a defense
89. Id. at *2.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *1-2.
92. 445 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2006) (op. on reh'g).
93. Id. at 383.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 383-84.
96. 719 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1983).
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was not unqualified (i.e., the tender was subject to a reservation of rights
to later deny coverage), it was entitled to settle the suit without consult-
ing the insurer. 97 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, explaining that its holding
in Rhodes was an "Erie guess," had since been undermined by the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in State Farm Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Maldo-
nado,98 and did not accurately reflect current Texas law. 99 Under Maldo-
nado, an insurer that tenders a defense with a reservation of rights is
entitled to enforce a consent-to-settle clause.100 The Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the trial court did not err in holding that the insured had
breached the policy by settling without the insurer's consent. 101
The insured next argued that even if it breached the consent-to-settle
clause, the insurer could not refuse to pay policy benefits unless it shows
actual prejudice from the breach. The Fifth Circuit noted, "it is not en-
tirely clear under Texas law whether an insurer must demonstrate
prejudice before it can avoid its obligations under a policy where the in-
sured breaches a prompt-notice provision or a consent-to-settle provi-
sion."' 102 Assuming, without deciding, that an insurer must show
prejudice, the Fifth Circuit stated that it was satisfied that the insurer suf-
fered prejudice as a matter of law. Emphasizing that "[a]n insurer's right
to participate in the settlement process is an essential prerequisite to its
obligation to pay a settlement," the Fifth Circuit decided that when, as in
this case, the insurer is not consulted about the settlement, the settlement
is not tendered to the insurer, and the insurer has no opportunity to par-
ticipate in or consent to the ultimate settlement decision, then the insurer
is prejudiced as a matter of law. 10 3 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the insured's breach of the consent-to-settle provision barred
its action against the insurer and, therefore, the insurer had no obligation
to reimburse the insured for the settlement.104
97. Motiva Enters., 445 F.3d at 384 (referencing Rhodes, 719 F.2d at 116 (stating that if
the insurer reserved its rights and the insured elected to pursue its own defense, the insurer
was bound to pay covered damages that were reasonable and prudent up to the policy
limits)).
98. 963 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1998).
99. Motiva Enters., 445 F.3d at 385 (citing Maldonado, 963 S.W.2d at 40).
100. Maldonado, 963 S.W.2d at 40.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 386.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 383, 387. The Fifth Circuit's decision was issued on March 28, 2006. On July
21, 2006, the Fifth Circuit issued a supplemental opinion upon its denial of the petition for
rehearing. Motiva Enters., LLC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 457 F.3d 459, 459 (5th
Cir. 2006). As an alternate basis for its conclusion that the insured could not recover from
the insurer, the Fifth Circuit highlighted the policy provision providing that the insurer has
no liability unless "the amount you owe has been determined with our consent or by actual
trial and final judgment." Id. at 459-60. Maldonado stood for the proposition that such a
policy provision is a condition precedent to coverage. Because the insured sought recovery
of a sum paid in settlement without the consent of the insurer, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the insured had failed to establish a condition precedent to coverage and, therefore,
that Maldonado precluded the insured's recovery. Id. at 460.
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5. An Insured's Failure to Cooperate in the Defense Can Preclude
Coverage
In Progressive County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trevino,10 5 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals interpreted a policy provision requiring that a
person who seeks coverage must cooperate in the investigation, settle-
ment, or defense of any claim or suit. The court of appeals determined
that the language of this provision was nearly identical to the policy lan-
guage addressed in Harwell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.10 6 and, therefore, held that this cooperation clause was a condition
precedent to coverage.10 7 The court of appeals explained that even
though there was no evidence that this condition precedent was satisfied,
the insurer could not escape liability unless it was prejudiced by the lack
of cooperation.'08 The evidence showed that the insured did not cooper-
ate with his defense, filed a pro se answer and frivolous counterclaim de-
spite having counsel hired by the insurer to represent him, adamantly
refused to have the insurer pay on the claim, and indicated to the insurer
through a message from his guardian that he did not intend to be in-
volved in the suit at all. Given this evidence, the court of appeals deter-
mined that the lawyer hired by the insurer to represent the insured "was
simply not permitted to appear on [the insured's] behalf in court." 10 9 As
such, the lawyer was prevented from mounting a defense to limit the lia-
bility and damages, from stopping the entry of the default judgment, and
from seeking a new trial or appellate relief. Based on these facts, the
court of appeals concluded that the insurer was prejudiced as a matter of
law by the insured's lack of cooperation and rendered a take-nothing
judgment in favor of the insurer.110
D. CGL POLICIES
1. The Texas Supreme Court Is Considering Whether Construction
Defect Claims Allege an "Occurrence" and "Property
Damage" Triggering Coverage under CGL Policies
Insurers, insureds, and courts continue to struggle in determining
whether claims for defective workmanship allege an "occurrence" and
"property damage" sufficient to trigger coverage under a commercial
general liability ("CGL") policy.111 For example, in Century Surety Co. v.
Hardscape Construction Specialties, Inc.,112 the United States District
105. 202 S.W.3d 811 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. filed).
106. 896 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. 1995).
107. Trevio, 202 S.W.3d at 815-16 (citing Harwell, 896 S.W.2d at 173-74).
108. Id. at 816.
109. Id. at 817.
110. Id. at 817-18, 820.
111. See generally Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 14-05-
00487-CV, 2006 WL 1892669, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 6, 2006, no pet.)
("The issue of whether CGL policies cover claims for defective construction is currently a
contentious issue in Texas and nationally.").
112. No. 4:05-CV-285-Y, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47563 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2006).
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Court for the Northern District of Texas determined that the insurer had
no duty to defend an underlying construction defect claim against the
insured because the claim arose from contractual obligations owed by the
insured and did not constitute an "occurrence" under the policy. Specifi-
cally, the underlying suit alleged claims for negligence, gross negligence,
breach of contract, and breach of implied and express warranties arising
from the construction of two swimming pools by the insured. 113 The in-
surer denied coverage asserting that the construction errors did not con-
stitute an "occurrence," defined in the policy as "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harm-
ful conditions.l1 14 The district court agreed with the insurer, finding that
the claims arose from the insured's "duties to provide design, construc-
tion and engineering services, which were purely contractual duties" and
that the insured's "injury was that the pools it was promised and paid for
were not the pools it received, which is not an 'occurrence' under the
policy. ' 115
Conversely, in Home Owners Management Enterprises, Inc. v. Mid-
Continent Casualty Co.,' 16 the same district court determined that claims
of foundation damage caused by the insured's negligence did constitute
an "occurrence" under a CGL policy.117 In reaching this decision, the
district court noted that the underlying plaintiffs did not allege that the
insured intended to cause foundation damage but claimed that the in-
sured negligently caused the damage.'18 The district court concluded that
"[a]n allegation of negligence constitutes an accidental 'occurrence'
under the policy and is sufficient to trigger" the insurer's duty to
defend. 119
These cases are illustrative of the ongoing conflict regarding these is-
sues. Fortunately, the Texas Supreme Court may finally resolve this
quagmire, as these issues have been certified by the Fifth Circuit. In La-
mar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co.,120 the Fifth Circuit ex-
plained that some courts have found that construction errors do not
constitute an "occurrence," concluding that a claim for defective work-
manship is really a claim for breach of contract, which is not covered, and
reasoning that shoddy work is foreseeable by the contractor and, there-
fore, is not an accidental or unexpected loss. 121 However, other courts
113. Id. at *4.
114. Id. at *11.
115. Id. at *13. See also Grimes Constr., Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 188 S.W.3d
805, 811 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. filed) (concluding that negligence allegations
were simply a "recharacterization" of basic breach of contract and warranty claims).
116. No. 3:04-CV-2061-BF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22524 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
117. Id. at *10; see also Summit Custom Homes, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 202
S.W.3d 823, 830 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. filed) (holding that "[t]here is an 'occur-
rence' if an action is intentionally taken, but negligently performed, and the damages are
unexpected or unintended").
118. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22524, at *16.
119. Id.
120. 428 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2005).
121. Id. at 196-97.
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have found an "occurrence" in this circumstance, reasoning that where
the shoddy workmanship is the result of the insured's negligence, rather
than intentional conduct, the loss is unexpected and, thus, accidental. 122
Texas state and federal courts are also in disagreement concerning
whether damage caused by defective workmanship constitutes "property
damage" under a CGL policy. Some courts have determined that such
claims do not allege "property damage," reasoning that claims for the
cost of repairing faulty workmanship are claims for pure economic loss.
Such claims do not constitute damage from "physical injury to tangible
property," as usually required by CGL policies, and typically flow from a
breach of contract. 123 These courts reason that CGL policies do not in-
sure against business risks since; to do so, would result in there being little
difference between a CGL policy and a performance bond. 124 In con-
trast, other courts have concluded that when construction errors cause
physical damage to property, that damage constitutes "property damage"
covered under a CGL policy regardless of whether the only "tangible
property" that is damaged is the property that is the object of the
contract. 125
Because of the frequency with which these issues are litigated and the
conflicting rulings by both the Texas courts of appeals and the federal
district courts, the Fifth Circuit certified to the Texas Supreme Court the
issues of whether a construction defect claim by a homeowner alleging
only damage to or loss of use of the home itself alleges an "occurrence"
and "property damage" sufficient to trigger the duty to defend or indem-
nify under a CGL policy. 126 The Texas Supreme Court accepted this case
on November 4, 2005, and heard oral argument on February 14, 2006, but
has yet to issue an opinion. For now, these issues likely will continue to
present problems for insureds and insurers alike.
2. Courts Disagree Over the Test for Determining When Property
Damage "Occurred"
In addition to the conflict over whether construction defect claims al-
lege an "occurrence" and "property damage," Texas courts also disagree
about the proper test to be applied in determining whether allegations of
ongoing or continuous property damage meet the requirement that the
property damage must "occur" during the policy period to trigger cover-
age under a CGL policy. The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas explained that the Texas Supreme Court has
identified five tests for determining when coverage is triggered for "con-
tinuing occurrences": (1) the pure or strict manifestation rule, deeming
coverage triggered by actual discovery of the injury; (2) the relaxed mani-
122. Id. at 197.
123. Id. at 198.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 199, 200-01.
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festation rule, deeming coverage triggered in the first policy period dur-
ing which discovery is possible; (3) the exposure rule, deeming coverage
triggered in any policy period when exposure to the cause occurred; (4)
the injury-in-fact rule, deeming coverage triggered in personal injury
cases when the "body's defenses are 'overwhelmed'"; and (5) the multi-
ple or triple-trigger approach, requiring coverage during period of contin-
uing exposure and manifestation.127 To date, the supreme court has not
adopted a specific trigger test, and some disagreement remains among
Texas courts of appeals.128
The district court further explained that despite unsettled Texas law,
the Fifth Circuit has taken a definitive position that the manifestation
theory applies to determine when coverage is triggered for property dam-
age claims.1 29 The district court decided that, in the absence of guidance
from the supreme court, it was bound by Fifth Circuit precedent and ap-
plied the manifestation rule.1 30 Based on the homeowners' allegations
that the mold and mildew became noticeable to them in 2001, the district
court concluded that the property damage manifested in 2001, that there
was no property damage that occurred during the 1996-97 policy period,
and that the allegations did not trigger coverage under the CGL policy.1 31
The Dallas Court of Appeals also follows the manifestation rule.132
The court of appeals explained that in its prior Dorchester Development
Corp. v. Safeco Insurance Co.133 decision, it had addressed the issue of
whether coverage exists for property damage that is caused by work per-
formed during the policy period, but that does not manifest until after the
policy period, and held that no coverage exists unless the property dam-
age manifests itself, or becomes apparent, during the policy period.1 34
While noting that a sister court of appeals refused to follow Dorchester
and rejected the manifestation rule, the court of appeals declined the in-
sured's request to revisit Dorchester and continued to apply the manifes-
tation rule. 135
In contrast, the Houston Court of Appeals rejected a blanket adoption
of the manifestation rule for all property damage claims and, instead, de-
cided that the exposure rule applied in certain circumstances. 136 Dis-
127. Bayou Bend Homes, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. H-05-1544, 2006 WL 2037564,
at *6 (S.D. Tex. July 18, 2006) (citing Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842,
853 n.20 (Tex. 1994)).
128. Id.




132. Summit Custom Homes, Inc., 202 S.W.3d at 827.
133. 737 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
134. Summit Custom Homes, Inc., 202 S.W.3d at 827 (citing Dorchester Dev. Corp., 737
S.W.2d at 383).
135. Id. (referring to Pilgrim Enters., Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 24 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
136. Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co, No. 14-05-00487-CV, 2006
WL 1892669, at *7-9 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 6, 2006, no pet).
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agreeing with the insured's assertion that Texas courts have consistently
adopted the manifestation rule, the court of appeals stated that only two
courts have adopted this rule and that the Texas Supreme Court has thus
far declined to adopt or reject it. 13 7 The court of appeals further ex-
plained that none of the cases adopting the manifestation rule involved
the same language as that in the CGL policies that the court was inter-
preting, which defined the term "occurrence" as including "continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions."'138 This language, however, was consid-
ered in Pilgrim Enterprises, which rejected the manifestation rule in favor
of the exposure rule.139 Emphasizing that the policies at issue omitted
reference to "manifestation," but did contain the "continuous or repeated
exposure" language, the court of appeals determined that any property
damage that occurred because of continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions during the policy period of a policy issued by the two insurers
was potentially covered. 140 The court of appeals therefore concluded that
each insurer had a duty to defend any claim alleging potential property
damage from a continuous or repeated exposure falling within a relevant
policy period. 141
3. The "Business-Risks" Exclusions
In Summit Custom Homes, Inc. v. Great American Lloyds Insurance
Co.,142 the Dallas Court of Appeals interpreted the standard exclusions in
CGL policies known as the "business-risks" exclusions. 143 Specifically,
the "your-work" exclusion precludes coverage for "'property damage' to
'your work' arising out of it or any part of it and included in the 'prod-
ucts-completed operations hazard.""' 44 The court of appeals explained
that the "your-work" exclusion generally bars coverage for "property
damage" to the insured's work arising after the owner has finished a con-
struction project has taken possession.145 This exclusion does not apply
"'if the damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises was
performed on your behalf by a subcontractor."' 1 46
The court of appeals reasoned that the insurance industry's 1986 incor-
poration of the "subcontractor exception" in the "your-work" exclusion
of the standard CGL policy "demonstrate[s] that insurers intended to
cover some defective construction resulting in damage to the insured's
work. ' 147 Based on this reasoning, the court of appeals summarized the
137. Id. at *7.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Pilgrim Enters., 24 S.W.3d at 496).
140. Id. at *8.
141. Id.
142. 202 S.W.3d 823 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. filed).
143. Id. at 829-30.
144. Id.
145. Id.




relationship among the "occurrence" requirement, the "your-work" ex-
clusion, and the "subcontractor exception" of a CGL policy as follows:
[Njegligently created, or inadvertent, defective construction resulting
in damage to the insured's own work that is unintended and unex-
pected can constitute an "occurrence." Nonetheless, the "your
work" or other "business risk" exclusions may preclude coverage for
the damage. However, in some instances, coverage will be restored if
the damaged work, or the work out of which the damage arose, was
performed by subcontractors. 14
Because the insured's work that was alleged to be defective (exterior fin-
ishing on the house referred to as "EIFS") had been installed and applied
by subcontractors, the "your work" exclusion did not apply to preclude
coverage for this claim.1 49
4. The "Construction-Defect" Exclusion
In Primary Plumbing Services, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's
London,150 the Houston Court of Appeals for the First District inter-
preted a policy exclusion that expressly stated that coverage was excluded
for "'any claim for loss or damage, including defense cost, involving con-
struction defect(s) caused or contributed by the insured, employees of the
insured or subcontractors of the named insured."' 1 51 The claimant in the
underlying suit alleged that the insured did not install a wall-hung lava-
tory properly, that the insured's failure to follow proper plumbing prac-
tices in installing the lavatory constituted negligence, and that she was
injured as a result of the insured's negligence. 152 The insured first argued
that the "construction defect" exclusion did not apply because the claim
was for bodily injury and not a construction defect. The court of appeals,
however, disagreed, explaining that the exclusion contained no language
limiting its application to certain types of claims or certain types of dam-
ages but instead broadly applied to any claim for loss or damage. The
court of appeals determined that the claim seeking recovery for bodily
injury was a claim for damage to which the exclusion applied. 153
The insured next argued that the exclusion did not apply because the
underlying pleading alleged negligence in the installation of the lavatory,
and "installation has nothing to do with construction. '154 Rejecting this
148. Id. (quoting Lennar Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 200 S.W.3d 651, 675 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. filed); accord Pine Oak Builders, Inc., 2006 WL 1892669, at
*4 (following Lennar, explaining that an allegation of faulty construction performed by a
subcontractor on the insured's behalf is "a prerequisite to coverage under the CGL poli-
cies' subcontractor exception to the 'your-work' exclusion" and determining that the stan-
dard CGL policy provides coverage for property damage caused by defective construction
performed by a subcontractor).
149. Id.
150. No. 01-05-00135-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 718 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
Jan. 26, 2006, pet. denied).
151. Id. at *11.
152. Id. at *3-4.
153. Id. at *10-11.
154. Id. at *11-12.
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argument, the court of appeals noted that the policy did not define the
term "construction defect," and, thus, the court had to give the term its
plain meaning found in the various dictionary definitions of the word
"construction. '' 155 The court of appeals found that regardless of the
pleading's use of the specific word "installation," the factual allegations
showed that the claimant was essentially alleging that the insured negli-
gently constructed, built, or assembled the lavatory. 156 The court of ap-
peals reasoned that by including an exclusion that, by its terms, applied to
any claim for loss or damage involving a construction defect, the parties
intended to exclude coverage for any claim for loss or damage arising out
of the insured's construction, assembly, or installation of plumbing fix-
tures; there was nothing in the exclusion that suggested it did not apply to
a claim for bodily injury as a result of the insured's negligent or substan-
dard "installation."' 157 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that
the claimant's alleged injuries constituted a loss or damage involving a
construction defect caused or contributed by the insured, that the con-
struction defect exclusion unambiguously applied to the underlying claim,
and, that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend. 158
E. HOMEOWNERS POLICIES
In Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds,159 the Texas Supreme Court, answering a
certified question from the Fifth Circuit, held that the "ensuing-loss
clause" in the standard Texas Homeowners Form B ("HO-B") policy
does not provide coverage for mold contamination caused by water dam-
age that is otherwise covered under the policy. 160 The supreme court be-
gan its opinion by emphasizing that its decision had to be based solely on
the policy's language and could not be affected by outside views concern-
ing a "mold crisis" in Texas:
The question in this case is not whether insurers should provide mold
coverage in Texas, a public policy question beyond our jurisdiction as
a court. The question instead is whether the language in an insur-
ance policy provides such coverage-no more and no less.
The rules for construing insurance policies have been around for a
longtime, long before this dispute arose. Those rules require us to
construe a policy according to what it says, not what regulators or
individual insurers thought it said. Ambiguities in the plain language
must be settled in favor of consumers, but they must appear in the
policy itself-we cannot create ambiguities from previous policies, an
agency's interpretation, or a "mold crisis."
The policy here provides that it does not cover "loss caused by
mold." While other parts of the policy sometimes make it difficult to
155. Id. at *12.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *12-13.
158. Id. at *14-15.
159. 202 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. 2006).
160. Id. at 745-46.
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decipher, we cannot hold that mold damage is covered when the pol-
icy expressly says it is not. 161
The policy exclusion in question stated: "We do not cover loss caused
by: . . . (2) rust, rot, mold or other fungi .... We do cover ensuing loss
caused by ... water damage . . . if the loss would otherwise be covered
under this policy. ' 162 In interpreting this language, the supreme court
reiterated the longstanding rule that all parts of a policy must be read
together, "giving meaning to every sentence, clause, and word to avoid
rendering any portion inoperative. ' 163 Although this exclusion ends
with, "We do cover ensuing loss caused by water damage," the supreme
court emphasized that it "cannot overlook the obvious-that the policy
provision here begins by stating unambiguously, 'We do not cover loss
caused by mold."1 64  I
The supreme court explained that in Lambros v. Standard Fire Insur-
ance Co.,165 the San Antonio Court of Appeals decided that for coverage
to exist pursuant to the ensuing-loss clause, the water damage must be the
result, rather than the cause, of the types of damage enumerated in the
exclusion, such as mold. 166 Because the application for writ of error was
refused, Lambros has the same force and effect as a supreme court deci-
sion. 167 The supreme court explained that acceptance of the interpreta-
tions offered by both the insured and the Texas Department of Insurance
would require it to overrule Lambros. Because a quarter century had
passed since Lambros without the insurance regulators making any
change to the policy, the supreme court declined the "invitation" to over-
rule Lambros.168
Examining the overall purpose of a homeowners policy, the supreme
court further explained that because the excluded risks-mold, wear and
tear, termites, etc.-damage a house incrementally and are very common,
construing the policy to cover all these risks "would convert it from an
insurance policy into a maintenance agreement."'1 69 Instead, the ensuing-
loss clause must be intended to provide coverage "only if these relatively
common and usually minor risks lead to a relatively uncommon and per-
haps major loss: building collapse, glass breakage, or water damage."' 70
The supreme court found that ordinary people would read the clause as
providing coverage "for the kinds of uncommon and catastrophic losses
161. Id. at 745.
162. Id. at 746.
163. Id. at 748.
164. Id.
165. 530 SW.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd).
166. Fiess, 202 S.W.3d at 748-49 (citing Lambros, 530 S.W.2d at 141).
167. Id. at 749.
168. Id. at 749-50; see also Lundstrom v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 192 S.W.3d 78, 94-
95 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (concluding, pre-Fiess, that regard-
less of whether the court agreed with Lambros, it was bound to follow that case as supreme
court precedent, and that, under Lambros, the mold damage, which followed rather than
preceded the water damage, was excluded from coverage).




for which homeowners obtain insurance, not for the uncommon mainte-
nance items for which they do not."'17 The supreme court further noted
that the insureds' argument that an ensuing-loss clause can make an ex-
cluded loss (here, mold) reappear as a covered loss had been rejected by
numerous courts in other states and that interpreting the policy as cover-
ing mold "would give ensuing-loss clauses in Texas a different meaning
from what they have in most other American jurisdictions. '172
For these reasons, the supreme court concluded that the ensuing-loss
clause could not be interpreted as providing coverage for mold and,
therefore, answered "No" to the certified question. 173 In closing, the su-
preme court instructed, "[i]f the political branches of Texas government
decide that mold should be covered in Texas insurance polices, they have
tools at their disposal to do so; Texas courts must stick to what those
policies say, and cannot adopt a different rule when a 'crisis9 arises."'
1 74
F. AUTO POLICIES
In Emcasco Insurance Co. v. American International Specialty Lines In-
surance Co.,' 75 the insurer, under a commercial auto liability policy,
brought a subrogation suit against a CGL insurer to recover amounts it
paid to settle an underlying suit against a mutual insured. The underlying
claimants were involved in an accident in which their car skidded on a
patch of mud, clay, 'and/or sand, swerved off the road, and struck a tree.
The claimants alleged that the mutual insured, the operator of a sand pit
adjacent to the accident site, had hauled sand from the pit in trucks it
owned and operated, that because of heavy rains preceding the accident,
the trucks tracked mud onto the road when exiting the pit, and that the
mud on the road was the producing cause of the accident. The CGL in-
surer denied coverage based on its policy's exclusion for bodily injury or
property damage "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, or en-
trustment to others of any.., auto.., owned or operated by or rented or
loaned to any insured. Use includes operation and loading or
unloading."'1 76
The Fifth Circuit explained that in deciding whether a duty to indem-
nify exists, Texas courts use the "complete operation" theory, under
which "'provision for use coverage extends to foreseeable consequences
of what was done in connection with the use of the car .... so long as the
act or thing done by the insured's employee which causes the accident
arises out of the use of the insured's car."' 177 The "complete operation"
test has two distinct inquiries: (1) whether the insured's act was an act
171. Id. at 751.
172. Id. at 752-53.
173. Id. at 753.
174. Id.
175. 438 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2006).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 524 (quoting Red Ball Motor Freight v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 189
F.2d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1951)).
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incident to, and having a connection with, the use of the auto; and (2)
whether that act proximately caused the claimant's injury.178
Addressing the first inquiry, the Fifth Circuit further explained that
Texas courts have read business auto policies to cover loading and un-
loading of the covered vehicle, even if that is not specifically mentioned
in the text of the policy. Loading and unloading has been interpreted to
cover acts incident to making a commercial delivery, including the entire
process involved in moving the articles from the place where the insured's
employees find the articles to the place where the employees turn the
articles over to the party to whom the articles are being delivered. 179
While noting that Texas courts have never decided whether mud, clay,
sand, or other debris tracked by a truck's tires or fallen from its cargo, are
incident to its use, the Fifth Circuit concluded that, based on "the broad
interpretation Texas courts have given to what is incident to the use of an
automobile," such debris is indeed incident to the use of the truck.18 0 In
reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that debris falling
from a vehicle's cargo is incident to the transportation of that cargo, and
it is inherent that in the transportation of cargo that some of it may spill
or fall onto the road. Further, the tracking of debris by tires is incident to
the operation of a vehicle on unpaved roads, as it is inherent in driving on
unpaved roads that some sand, mud, or clay may attach to the tires. 181
The Fifth Circuit also rejected a requirement of contemporaneous use of
the vehicle and instead concluded, "[t]he accident need not be contempo-
raneous with the use of the vehicle so long as it is a foreseeable conse-
quence of an act incidental to the use of the vehicle, such as the tracking
of debris. '182
Having concluded that the first part of the test had been met (i.e., the
tracking of mud onto the road was incident to the use of the vehicle), the
Fifth Circuit turned to the second issue of whether the tracking of mud
onto the road was the proximate cause of the injuries. 183 The Fifth Cir-
cuit emphasized that the operation or driving of the vehicle need not be
the proximate cause of the injuries; rather, only the act that is incident to
the use of the vehicle must be the proximate cause of the injuries. 184 Re-
viewing the evidence under this standard, the Fifth Circuit decided that a
genuine issue of material fact existed.18 5 Although it was foreseeable that
debris left on the road could cause an accident, it could not be deter-
mined whether the accident would not have occurred but for the tracking
of the debris by the truck's tires, as rain washing the mud and sand off the
unpaved road onto the public, paved road could have independently pro-
178. Id. at 525.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 525-26.
181. Id. at 526.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 527.
185. Id. at 528.
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duced the accident. 186 "When two separate events-one that is excluded
and one that is covered by the general liability policy-may indepen-
dently have caused the accident, Texas law mandates that the general lia-
bility policy also provide coverage despite the exclusion.' 87 Thus, if the
rain washed sufficient mud onto the road to have independently caused
the accident, then the CGL policy would have covered the accident.' 88
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment for the CGL insurer had been improper and, therefore, remanded
the case. I 89
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. PROPRIETY OF UNDERLYING CLAIMANT AS A PARTY TO
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION
In Century Surety Co. v. Hardscape Construction Specialties, Inc.,190 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas decided
that an underlying claimant may be a proper party to a declaratory judg-
ment action between the insurer and the insured. 191 The insurer initiated
a declaratory judgment action against its insured and the underlying
claimant, seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify
the insured in the underlying suit. The district court noted that the pur-
pose of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act is to "settle 'actual' contro-
versies before they ripen into violations of law or breach of some
contractual duty. 1 92 Moreover, under Texas law, the duty to indemnify
is justiciable before the insured's liability is determined in the underlying
lawsuit, and a party injured by an insured is generally viewed as a third-
party beneficiary of a liability policy.193 Finding that the underlying
claimant "derives its right, if any, to collect insurance proceeds directly
from the rights of" the insured, the district court held that the claimant is
deemed to be in privity by virtue of its shared legal interest. 194 The dis-
trict court held that the underlying claimant was properly named as a
party to the declaratory judgment action and would be bound by the de-
termination as to coverage for the underlying claim "due to the derivative
nature of its right to recovery."'1 95
186. Id. at 527.
187. Id. at 528.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. No. 4:05-CV-285-Y, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47563 (N.D. Tex. July 13, 2006).
191. Id. at *16.
192. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201(a)).
193. Id. at *15 (citing Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.
1997) and State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ollis, 768 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1989)).




B. FIFTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT STATE-LAW TORT CLAIMS ARE
PREEMPTED BY THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE ACT OF 1968
In C.W. Gallup v. Omaha Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 196 the
Fifth Circuit held that the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 expressly
preempts all state-law tort claims against an insurer.197 The plaintiffs as-
serted several state-law claims against a Write Your Own insurer under
the National Flood Insurance Program, including claims for breach of
contract and bad faith.' 98 The insurer sought dismissal of the claims, ar-
guing that the state-law claims were preempted by a December 2000 reg-
ulation promulgated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
("FEMA") that states "all disputes arising from the handling of any claim
under" the Standard Flood Insurance Policy "are governed exclusively by
the flood insurance regulations issued by FEMA, the National Flood In-
surance Act of 1968, and Federal common law."' 99 The trial court denied
the insurer's motion to dismiss, holding that FEMA was not authorized
by Congress to preempt the application of state laws to extra-contractual
claims and that preemption was inconsistent with the purposes of the
Act.200 The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's denial of the insurer's
motion to dismiss, holding that state-law tort claims are expressly pre-
empted by the Act and related regulations. 20 1
196. 434 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2005).
197. Id. at 345.
198. Id. at 344.
199. Id. at 343.
200. Id. at 344.
201. Id. at 345.
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